Beyond negotiations: Palestinian strategies for advancing peace 13 May 2010 |
Since the UN General Assembly meeting in the fall, the whole thrust of American policy has been to try to get the parties back into negotiations, with the apparent hope that this would then create its own dynamic and open spaces for significant progress.
The idea of “proximity talks” in which Americans would speak alternately to Israeli and Palestinian negotiators who would not meet directly, came out of the administration’s efforts to find a way for the Palestinians to return to negotiations with Israel without a complete settlement freeze. This is, of course, an unfortunate throwback to the pre-Madrid era. An even worse throwback is the renewed Palestinian reliance on “approval” from the Arab League for what ought to be strictly Palestinian decisions regarding negotiations with Israel.
With expectations for the talks being what they are, all parties are wondering whether or not the Americans have a “Plan B”. Washington is currently embroiled in significant debates about the alternatives. One camp is urging the possible development of a broad-ranging and specific US peace plan. Another is cautioning against raising expectations and counselling that no significant progress is possible under the present circumstances. A third possibility is for the United States to internationalise the process by calling a peace summit at the end of the year in the event of a continued stalemate.
The Palestinian leadership is committed to negotiations but has no confidence they can achieve anything significant immediately given the present political climate and makeup of the Israeli cabinet. At the same time, they are resolutely opposed to armed struggle or another violent intifada. Because of this conundrum, they have been developing a series of creative alternative strategies designed to complement diplomacy and provide additional sources of momentum towards peace.
The most important of these is the state and institution building programme adopted in August 2009 by the PA cabinet, which includes creating a fully functioning bureaucracy and the institutional, economic and infrastructural basis for a successful, independent Palestinian state.
The idea is that as negotiations proceed slowly for the meanwhile, Palestinians can build the framework of their state, making independence not just a theoretical possibility but a potentially practical reality. It calls the bluff of all parties, challenging them to assess if they were ever serious about their stated commitment to a peace based on a Palestinian state.
In addition, the PA has been increasingly promoting nonviolent protests and civil disobedience in the West Bank targeted at the occupation. These protests, such as those at villages affected by the West Bank separation barrier, highlight abusive Israeli policies, and confront the occupation in a proactive but peaceful manner.
A third tactic in this emergent peaceful strategy to confront the occupation are various economic measures aimed at ridding the Palestinian economy of settlement goods, encouraging European and other states to boycott settlement products and preventing Palestinians from working in settlements. The economic aim here is to replace the settlement elements of the Palestinian economy with indigenous ones, providing alternatives to the Palestinians subsidising the settlements themselves and simultaneously expanding the Palestinian economy. All these measures are designed to emphasise the distinction between Israel itself and the occupation, and focus attention on the contradicting interests of most Israelis on the one hand, and extremist settlers on the other. Palestinians are saying to ordinary Israelis, “Our policy is not aimed at you or your country but at the extremist settlers whose activities, because they are antithetical to peace, are in the end are as damaging to you as they are to us.”
All this means that, while the Palestinian leadership is committed to a negotiated agreement, they are not relying solely on American leadership or Israeli sincerity and are developing parallel, complementary tracks that they can control and which bolster diplomacy.
All parties seriously committed to a two-state agreement, especially the international community, should welcome and support these new Palestinian initiatives, especially the state and institution building program.
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* Hussein Ibish is a Senior Fellow at the American Task Force on Palestine and blogs at www.ibishblog.com.
This article was written for the Common Ground News Service (CGNews).
Source: Common Ground News Service (CGNews), 13 May 2010,
www.commongroundnews.org
Copyright permission is granted for publication.
Source: Common Ground News Service (CGNews), 13 May 2010,
www.commongroundnews.org
Copyright permission is granted for publication.
Common Ground News Service
In the fifth article in our series on religious freedom in the Israeli-Palestinian context, Hussein Ibbish from the American Task Force on Palestine contends that in a future Palestinian state, religious freedom will be possible only if the state structure is founded on secular values.
(Source: Common Ground News Service (CGNews), 28 January 2010)
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