UNITED NATIONS INTERNATIONAL MEETING ON THE QUESTION OF PALESTINE
March 25, 2014 Quito, Ecuador
March 25, 2014 Quito, Ecuador
Statement of ATFP Pres. Ziad Asali
Introduction:
Over
recent decades, particularly in the context of United Nations Security
Council Resolution 242 and all subsequent resolutions following the 1967
war, an overwhelming international consensus has emerged in favor of
peace in the Middle East based on two states -- Israel and Palestine --
living side by side in peace, security and dignity. The Palestinian
state will be highest form and vehicle for realizing the inalienable
rights of the Palestinian people through the exercise of
self-determination.
Since it was established in Madrid in 2002, this
international consensus has been most directly expressed through the
Middle East Quartet -- the United States, the European Union, the UN
Secretariat, and Russia --
which has effectively given the imprimatur of the entire international
community to the project of seeking this outcome. Moreover, a solid
majority of both Israelis and Palestinians have expressed a preference
for this outcome in virtually every poll and survey over more than two
decades. Despite the enormous frustrations resulting from a lack of
peace, these majorities remain committed to this goal. The Arab League
has unanimously expressed the Arab consensus in favor of this as well,
through the Arab Peace Initiative. With the exception of a few outliers
internationally and in any given society, the whole world essentially
agrees on both a two-state solution and its fundamental outlines: a
Palestinian state alongside Israel based on the
1967 borders with mutually agreed land swaps and its capital in East
Jerusalem, a fair and just resolution of the refugee issue, and full
regional acceptance, recognition and integration of Israel in the Middle
Eastern family of nations, and guarantees for its security.
There
is an obvious reason for this consensus: it is the only potential
conflict-ending solution. Other outcomes are achievable, most notably a
continuation of the conflict in its present or modified forms. All other
formulas are either fanciful and unachievable or would simply extend
the conflict, albeit potentially in a somewhat altered context. Both of
the parties, their neighbors and the entire world have a large stake in
resolving this most long-lasting and politically damaging of conflicts.
It is in the interest of no responsible party and no sensible people to
wish to continue the Israeli-Palestinian conflict any longer. And this
has been true for decades now. The problem before us today is, why have
we been unable to achieve a conflict-ending two-state peace agreement,
and what can be done to advance that crucial goal?
Obstacles to Advancing Peace:
The
fundamental problem confronting all efforts to develop a two-state
solution and realize the international consensus on a two-state peace
agreement boils down to a fundamental disconnect between stated policy
versus practical politics at several registers. Practical politics
interferes with the stated policy aim of achieving a two-state solution.
Everyone says they are for it, yet everyone is held back -- at least to
some extent -- by political considerations and restraints.
The
first, and perhaps most far-reaching of these, is a fundamental lack of
trust that political leaders on both sides confront. For both Israelis
and Palestinians, there is a lack of trust between the two sides, both
at the political leadership and popular registers. Israelis and
Palestinians do not believe each other, and while strong majorities of
both say they want a two-state solution, they also say they believe the
other side does not. They believe, in other words, that they are telling
the truth but the other side is lying and has actual goals that are
fundamentally incompatible with a two-state agreement. Second, there is a
gap between the leaderships and their own publics. Both Israeli and
Palestinian leaders have not done enough to prepare their peoples for
the necessary and inevitable concessions that must be made to secure a
viable peace agreement. Often the general publics on both sides don't
trust their political leaderships to secure their interests, and leaders
find themselves harassed on peace issues from both their left and right
wing flanks. Finally, on both sides, political leaders lack strong
personal and political incentives to make bold steps towards peace, even
if that is clearly in the national interest of both Israel and the
Palestinians. They face opposition within their own political
establishments, which, on both sides, include significant and empowered
actors that are either not committed to a
two-state solution, or who find a personal or political benefit in
opposing the necessary steps to advance one. There are powerful forces
in both the Israeli and Palestinian political establishments opposed a
two-state solution, in some cases under the present circumstances, and
in some cases altogether. This is particularly damaging, and presents
the most direct obstacle to leaders for the necessary compromises to
move the process forward.
The
agreed-upon final status issues themselves present another serious set
of obstacles to advancing peace, because – despite significant progress
in bridging the gaps over the past quarter century – the distance
between the parties on these specific issues remain real and
substantive. As the peace process has ground on, there have been several
highly sanguineous and traumatizing eruptions of violence during the
past two decades. Expanded settlement construction, ongoing occupation,
violence, incitement, and regional and international meddling have
exacerbated these problems. All these factors have led to a hardening of
positions. In the past, both negotiators and the publics they represent
appeared to be more flexible, and have more wiggle room, on the final
status issues.
Amid growing cynicism
about the prospects for the realization of a genuine and lasting
two-state solution, self-serving narratives about the history of the
peace process on both sides have intensified their grip on the public
imagination, making compromise more politically difficult both to
propose and to implement. Everyone agrees there are difficult choices to
be made, but the political conditions render making them far more
difficult than it should be.
The
Middle East and North Africa region is currently undergoing a period of
protracted instability and change, the outcome of which cannot be
predicted or controlled (although it can be strongly influenced by sound
policies). Under circumstances of uncertainty, societies typically fall
back on familiar narratives, traditional positions that do not easily
lend themselves to compromise, and an attachment to traditional
assumptions that are familiar even though they may also be unsustainable
and dangerous. Regional dynamics have also proven to be an impediment
given the relentless interference in Israeli-Palestinian dynamics, and
internal Palestinian politics, by various regional actors, some of whom
are not
committed to a two-state solution. Most notably Iran has used the
Palestinian issue as a tool for its own foreign policy, and used proxies
in the occupied Palestinian territories, Lebanon and Syria to undermine
the prospects for a peace agreement. These forces use Palestine as a
proxy for their own, independent, and sometimes entirely unrelated,
purposes, and as a means to distract from other realities.
Another
major impediment to peace arising from the present condition of
instability in much of the region is the present inability of Egypt --
which is an indispensable partner in achieving a sustainable
Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement, and even significant progress
towards such an agreement -- to play such a role because it is
undergoing a period of difficult transition of its own. Over the past
three years, it has become increasingly clear that it is more difficult
than ever to attempt to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in
isolation from its regional context. Instead, it must be part of a
broader transformation throughout the Middle East. And, in particular,
crucial peace partners such as
Egypt, Jordan and the Gulf states must be in a position to play their
necessary roles.
Regional turmoil, in
Syria and many other Arab states, also means that the
Israeli-Palestinian issue has receded as an immediate priority for much
of the international community, including many in the American political
establishment, and even in the Arab world. Simply put, Palestine is no
longer the overriding issue on the international and regional agenda
that it was for so long, although its long-term strategic significance
remains undiminished. The relative de-prioritizing of Palestine in the
minds of many is a mistake, but also an unsurprising outcome of the
broader turmoil facing much of the rest of the region. In Israel, this
turmoil is often misinterpreted as arguing for a strategic imperative
that
emphasizes security based on a "fortress" mentality, emphasizing walls,
missile-defense systems and a risk-averse approach to regional changes.
But it could, and should, prove a catalyst for greater cooperation, or
at least understanding, between Israel and many of the Arab states that
share some of its core concerns about the strategic future of the Middle
Eastern region. However, lack of progress towards a two-state solution
is greatly hampering prospects of turning these potential convergences
into open cooperation.
Opportunities for advancing peace:
Despite
this relatively gloomy assessment, there are real reasons to hope and
assume that a two-state solution remains not only a plausible outcome,
but the most likely one because it is in the interests of all parties
over the long run. The most obvious new opportunity for progress is the
dynamic personal engagement of the American Secretary of State John
Kerry. Through skill and determination he has accomplished more than
most thought possible a mere 12 months ago.
If,
for the reasons outlined above, the present circumstances are not
conducive to a major breakthrough on final status issues in the
immediate term, in their own core interests all parties need to "buy
time" to sustain the viability of a two-state solution. Should no major
breakthrough emerge in coming weeks for both political and strategic
reasons, the parties, the region and the international community all
have a major incentive to keep the prospects for peace alive. They
should work together to achieve such progress or measures as can be
realized in order to ensure that Israelis and Palestinians, other Middle
Easterners, and people and leaders around the world do not give up on
the prospect for
a two-state, conflict-ending peace agreement.
The
prospect for a real engagement by significant regional players in the
Israeli-Palestinian dynamic in a positive, rather than a
counterproductive, manner is foreseeable. Jordan has made its
willingness to play a significant and helpful, and indispensable, role
clear. Many of the Gulf states, too, appear interested in playing a
constructive role if possible. And it is likely that Egypt, once it has
reestablished domestic security and secured its new political system,
will once again emerge as a central player in the pursuit of a
conflict-ending agreement. However, a series of horizons can be
identified to all of the regional obstacles and opportunities outlined
above. They must be taken advantage of when
they present themselves, or cultivated and encouraged to emerge.
Otherwise, they may become yet another footnote in the endless catalog
of missed opportunities in the Israeli-Palestinian annals.
One
of the more encouraging recent developments that presents a new
opportunity for advancing the peace agenda is the emerging policy of the
European Union and key EU member states individually of declining to
subsidize or be involved in Israel's settlement project. The recent
negotiations over the "Horizon 2020" EU-Israel joint research project,
in which Europe insisted that no funding would be extended to areas not
under Israel's jurisdiction before 1967, was an excellent model of how
the international community can emphasize to Israel that while it
emphasizes Israel's legitimacy, it does not accept the legitimacy of its
settlement project and will not cooperate with it. Efforts by
Germany and other European states to extend this multilateral approach
to existing and future bilateral agreements, and to include private
sector initiatives as well as purely public sector ones, are also highly
encouraging. This European approach is based firmly in international
law, pursuant to a two-state agreement, and a responsible intervention
to try to de-incentivize Israel from further provocative settlement
construction and other unlawful activity in the occupied Palestinian
territories.
Similarly, some official
American rhetoric increasingly constitutes a kind of "tough love" for
Israel by emphasizing the potential consequences of a failure to
compromise with the Palestinians on peace and to maintain the occupation
and the status quo. Recent comments by US President Barack Obama that,
should peace talks fail, the United States might not be able to contain
the international consequences for Israel are a prime example of such
rhetorical toughening. Palestinians, too, have been hearing from both
Europe and the United States about the urgent need for them to not only
compromise with Israel, but also to reform their own governance and
public-sector structures. Some of these warnings
have been tied to aid and other assistance programs to the Palestinian
Authority, just as the EU is making its investments in Israel contingent
on its funding not being expended in the occupied territories. All of
this is heartening because it constitutes friends and allies doing what
they always should: encouraging in word and deed the parties to do what
they need to in order to make serious progress towards a peace
agreement, or at least maintain its viability and prevent any
significant re-eruption of violence on the ground. On the whole, Western
friends of both Israel and the Palestinians are becoming less knee-jerk
and more critical in their responses to the conduct of the parties. A
further such measure might be holding senior
officials on all sides accountable for statements that gratuitously and
brazenly undermine the two-state solution, and credibility and viability
of efforts to achieve it.
What can be done now?
If
it's true that a major substantive breakthrough on the core final
status issues is unlikely in coming weeks, then what can be done
immediately to maintain the viability of peace and improve the situation
on the ground? Short of the urgent goal of ending the occupation,
certainly Palestinians are in dire need of greater economic assistance,
development and reform. The PA is under-funded and its ongoing fiscal
crisis exacerbates the difficulties in maintaining stability and
empowering leaders to compromise. It is a source of tension that can be
fairly easily dealt with, given the political will in the West and among
the Arab states to provide the necessary financial aid. Palestinians,
too, must do their
part in heeding the advice of all of the multilateral and international
economic and financial institutions by trying to shift from a top-heavy,
public sector-based economy to one that focuses more on private sector
initiatives. Palestinians will need significant external assistance, and
at least non-interference, if not cooperation, from Israel, in order to
create more small and medium-sized private sector businesses. These can
form the basis for a sustainable domestic economy into the future, and
in a Palestinian state to come. In this regard there have been several
encouraging Israel-Palestinian private sector initiatives that are
worthy of support.
Similarly,
Palestinian institution-building, which was initiated at the end of the
last decade, and has been fraying somewhat of late for both political
and financial reasons, needs to be reinvigorated. This will require
significant efforts on the part of all parties. The Palestinians must
have the will to reengage institution-building in a focused and
determined manner. Israel must not use the occupation to thwart or
stymie the creation of the institutions for a future Palestinian state.
And the international community, particularly the West and the Arab
world, must provide the political, technical, institutional, educational
and financial backing for such projects. Not only will they help to
provide the
basis for Palestinian statehood, such efforts will foster and engender
hope in the future within Palestinian society and promote stability and
enhance the prospects for peace.
Palestinian
political and institutional reform should be strongly encouraged.
Notwithstanding the significant practical and political difficulties
involved, municipal and national elections should be held. Palestinian
political space would benefit from a wider public debate and engagement
with civil society. The primary initiative for this must come from the
Palestinians themselves, but, again, they will require international
assistance and Israeli non-interference in order to achieve this
important goal. The Palestinian people, Israel and the international
community all should have a strong interest in helping Palestine engage
in a thoroughgoing process of institutional development.
Finally,
the international community should continue to develop and intensify
efforts to de-incentivize Israel from any further illegal activities in
the occupied Palestinian territories, particularly additional settlement
construction, home demolitions, the expansion of the separation
barrier, land seizures, population displacement, and many other
practices that are prohibited under the Fourth Geneva Convention and
other key bedrocks of international law. As the occupying power, Israel
has rights and responsibilities, but also clear restrictions which it
cannot be allowed to violate without consequences. As long as
Palestinians perceive the occupation as intensifying and further
entrenching with every year
of the peace process dragging on without a clear path to Palestinian
independence, all other obstacles will be exacerbated. Nothing is more
damaging to the prospects for achieving a conflict-ending, two-state
peace agreement, or more detrimental to stability.
Because
of some of Israel's occupation policies, especially settlement
expansion, the Israeli-Palestinian relationship is not a static one, but
rather is a dynamic that is in almost continuous deterioration. This
must stop. If final-status issue breakthroughs are to be achieved in the
future, encouraging Palestinians to focus on institution-building and
reform and discouraging Israel from unlawful and damaging occupation
policies is crucial. The international community has a major opportunity
and responsibility to take significant measures to improve conditions
on the ground, and between the parties, through such incentives and
disincentives which can stabilize the situation in the immediate term.
Ultimately this also can lay the groundwork for progress on a
final-status, conflict-ending Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement.
American Task Force on Palestine.
1634 Eye St
Suite 725
Washington, DC -20006
United States
Suite 725
Washington, DC -20006
United States
- 202-887-0177 - info@atfp.net - The American Task Force on Palestine
No comments:
Post a Comment