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Arab Myths Distort Understanding Of American Policy by Dr James Zogby: As I attempted to demonstrate in "Arab Voices: What They Are Saying and Why It Matters" we, in the West, are still mystified by the Arab World. Absent real understanding, our public discourse and, too often, our policy debates are informed by crude myths and negative stereotypes of the region, its culture, and its people. |
Monday September 23, 2013
Dr James Zogby
I have noted on other occasions that much the same is true in the Arab World. Having just returned from the Middle East, I continue to be struck by how much of the Arab World's political discussion about American policy is myth-based.
There are two persistent myths that influence Arab
perceptions about why and how America does what it does in the world.
The first is that they think we are smart—that we know what we are doing
and intend the consequences of our actions. The other myth is a
variation of the first, and that is that we are all-powerful and can do
almost anything—so when we do something and make a mess or when we don't
act, there must be a reason.
Both of these myths, after having been given a real run in conversations about the horrific war in Iraq, are again on full display in analyses of US policies toward Egypt and Syria. In discussions about both situations, assumptions are made that American policies are informed and intentional with the resultant consequences having been anticipated.
In the case of Egypt, one line of thought begins with
"America supported the Muslim Brotherhood". As it is developed, the
argument is made that the US saw (or hoped for) the creation of a "Sunni
crescent" in the Middle East as a check against Iran and its allies.
As evidence for this assumption, some point to the
simple fact that President Obama recognized the elected Muslim
Brotherhood President, Mohamed Morsi, and continued US assistance
programs to Egypt. Adherents of this view believe that their case gets
stronger when they note that in the lead up to Tamarrod, the US
Ambassador to Egypt addressed a public gathering in which she actively
discouraged demonstrations, suggesting that political activists should,
instead, strengthen opposition political parties and prepare for the
next election. A few days later, the Ambassador paid a visit the Muslim
Brotherhood headquarters to meet with the group's leader.
Then, after the military deposed Morsi, the
Administration didn't immediately embrace the transition and instead
sent a high ranking State Department official to urge reconciliation and
political compromise. Case closed.
The reality, however, was far more complex. One the one
hand, it was entirely reasonable for the US to attempt to work with the
elected government of the largest and most strategically important Arab
country. America has important interests to protect in the region and
sees peace, stability, and progress in Egypt as a key component to those
interests. It might also be seen as reasonable that a US official would
caution against potentially destabilizing demonstrations and, for the
same reason, after the military action of July 3rd, urge the parties to
seek some level of accommodation and a restoration of civil order.
Where fault can be found is with American intelligence
failing to understand the depth of Egyptian frustration with the Morsi
government and the degree to which its agenda had alienated the population.
The bottom line is that as difficult as it may be for those who would
rather comfort themselves with the certainty of myths and conspiracy
theories, America didn't have a clue what was going on in Egypt and was
operating in the blind on autopilot. No conspiracy, just mistakes in an
effort to protect interests.
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