December 13, 2010 - 9:03am
Q: First, do you think that Israel could continue to hold out a decision onwhat to do with the Palestinians? Earlier you noted that stasis is not possible, but isn't that what we have had since the failure of Oslo, a "stasis" that perhaps dates back to 1967?
A: I say stasis is not possible for the state and institution building program. My point in this context is that this project is predicated on continual expansion and will wither and ultimately die if it does not continue to expand. It is this very quality that gives it its greatest strength in terms of challenging the occupation. It actually doesn't allow for what its strongest opponents on the Palestinian side accuse it of: accepting the status quo and making that work. If it doesn't keep expanding, it will start retracting and will not survive. If it isn't the project that lays the groundwork for statehood, it's pretty meaningless. An understanding of that was strongly expressed in Sec. Clinton's address at the Brookings Institution on December 10. I think there are a lot of Israelis who grudgingly understand it as well.
Yes, of course there has been a consistent status quo in the occupied territories since 1967, but only in the broadest possible sense. In June 1967 the occupied territories became occupied by Israel, and they remain occupied. But that's hardly “stasis.” The ebb and flow within the context of that occupation has been fairly dramatic, including the first intifada, the Oslo years, the second intifada and now the circumstances defined by the new Palestinian security forces and the state building program. And that's leaving out everything that's happened in Gaza. And of course the biggest single change has been the gradual introduction of what are now 500,000 Israeli settlers. You don't have stasis in the occupied territories even though you have an ongoing occupation. You have a continually deteriorating situation in terms of entrenching the occupation, anger on both sides and an expansion of the constituencies opposed to a reasonable peace agreement, and conditions that ensure that a failure to achieve a peace agreement will result in another round of bloodshed that is even worse and more religious than the last. Offsetting this are signs of the growing maturation in Palestinian strategy to deal with the occupation, particularly the state building program but also nonviolent protests, settlement boycotts and other such strategies.
The bottom line is the status quo of occupation is neither acceptable nor tenable. If it isn't resolved it will eventually erupt in another wave of terrible violence. The biggest illusion possible is that the situation is stable or manageable. One of the very few virtual certainties I think is worth accepting in this situation is that absent an agreement to end the occupation there will be wave after wave of violent resistance to it in unpredictable spasms. I'm also willing to bet those waves become increasingly violent and increasingly religious, as we can see developed during the first intifada and then throughout the second. I think it's even reasonable to put the Gaza war in exactly that context as a third example, and it only deepens my point. So, no, “stasis” isn't possible in the context of the occupation at all.
Q: Second, if Israel will not allow for the creation of a Palestinian state, what is the alternative that you allude to twice in your essay? How does it fit with the "broader agenda" you spoke of?
A: Of course the only real alternative outcome to an end to the occupation and the creation of a Palestinian state is further conflict....READ MORE
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